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MA Literary Translation: Translation Theory

Towards an Intentist Method of Translation.

(5353 words)

## 1.Introduction

Professor Gary Iseminger describes the matter of authorial intention and meaning as “some of the most difficult and disputed territory in philosophy” (1992:9): What is intention? Where is the meaning of a work found? Does an author exist? Can intention be discovered? Wimsatt and Beardsley (1970), addressing this latter question originally in 1954, suggest not, stating that the author’s intention is “neither available nor desirable”, particularly as a tool for judging a work’s merit (1970:3). Roland Barthes later wrote what Burke (2004:19) views as “the single most influential meditation on the question of authorship in modern times”, when he posited that authorial intention and biographical foundations have no bearing on the interpretation of a work and so proclaimed the “death of the Author” in 1968 (here, 1977:148). Such meditations have provoked much subsequent discussion.<sup>1</sup> One such recent response is the development of a movement known as ‘Intentism’.

Founded initially by London-based artist Vittorio Pelosi and consolidated at the inaugural Intentism Exhibition and Conference in 2009, Intentism is now an international art movement which includes artists, writers, actors, musicians and philosophers who believe that art can indeed “convey an artist’s intended message to his or her intended audience” (Pelosi, 2009:3). This belief evolved and splintered from the Postmodern model of seeking the meaning of art, whereby meaning is found “through a dialogue between the artwork and the interpreter” (ibid:8) and so the artwork means whatever the interpreter understands it to mean. As this may differ for each interpreter, Pelosi holds that “not all interpretations are equally valid” (ibid:22), giving a hypothetical example of one receiver interpreting the work as racist or inciting hatred. Without authorial intent being taken into consideration, he argues, there are “definitely ways [the work] can be misunderstood” (ibid.), therefore, to Intentists, the author’s intention is paramount. Intentists such as Professor William Irwin (see Christie, 2011: n.p.) view an important distinction between “meaning and significance” (Irwin, 2002b:199), as only the creator of the artwork, and not the receiver, “is responsible for the meaning” (Pelosi, 2009:12), whilst recognising that the receiver can “attribute certain significances to the artwork” (ibid.) Thus, in the case of multiple interpretations, these are seen by Intentists as multiple significances to multiple receivers, not multiple meanings of the work, and each new significance should not be seen as a new meaning. Intentism further defines intention itself not as meaning, but as, according to Pelosi, a “performance

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<sup>1</sup> See, for instance, volumes such as Newton-De Molina (1976), Iseminger (1992) and Irwin (2002a)

expectation” (Christie, 2011: n.p.): the intention is realised when the artist’s performance meets his/her expectations. The work is imbued with meaning through intentions and is therefore a vehicle for that meaning, leading Intentists to claim that “all meaning is the outworking of intention” (ibid.)

According to Gutt’s definition, the Intentists’ “notion of the world surrounding [them]” (Gutt, 2005:15) can constitute Intentist *theory*. As a new movement<sup>2</sup>, we have yet to see where Intentist theory belongs in relation to other theories and disciplines. As a translator, my personal tendency has been to question how this new theory relates to Translation Studies, which as a discipline itself, is not averse to looking outside the field for theories which could influence translation. Or, as Fawcett and Guadarrama García (2010:2) see it, “theories [...] brought in to enable both practitioner and scholar to better understand the phenomenon of translation as such.” It is with this in mind that I am interested in analysing the relationship between Intentism and Translation, in order to ascertain whether Intentism can inform Translation Studies; that is, as Collins English Dictionary (2008:438) defines it, “impart some essential or formative characteristic” to Translation Studies, in such a way that an Intentist-driven translation approach becomes apparent. To determine this, the following section of this essay will focus on several principal features of Intentism in closer detail, considering how they fit into translation discourse and what consequences they may have for translation. I shall then take into account the link between theory and practice, as I attempt to draw out from Intentist theory an Intentist method of translation, focussing on implications for the translator. Finally, to clarify, throughout this essay ‘translation’ refers to literary translation, unless otherwise specified.

## 2. The relationship between translation and Intentism

I believe there are five principle concerns of Intentist theory which are relevant to translation: intended meaning, and, by extension, intended purpose; two Intentist maxims of ‘no creative input, no meaning input’ and ‘zero intention, zero accountability’; and the creative trail employed in Intentist works.

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<sup>2</sup> Although Intentism is not necessarily based on new ideas, it does have its own views on the debate.

2(i). Intended Meaning

It may matter little to some readers that the meaning of a work lies ultimately, for Intentists, in the intentions of the creator. They may be content with their own interpretation of the text and, although their understanding, in Intentists' eyes, may be a *misunderstanding*, this is unlikely to have any major consequences. For a translator-reader, however, understanding the meaning of a text is essential, as we are required to reproduce it in a target text, or at least create something equivalent. If the meaning is to be found in the author's intentions, then the most pressing matter is how to discover those intentions. Pelosi maintains that intention is "not as elusive as some would suggest" (2009:8) in partial response to Wimsatt and Beardsley. He provides the following, whereby we may seek intention, and, although he refers specifically to art here, these concepts can be transferred to literature:

- a. Interpreting the work through sketches [drafts] that preceded it.
- b. Reading any notes or communication on the work.
- c. Placing the work in the artist's [author's] oeuvre and using this to compare ideas and artistic progression.
- d. Seeing the work in the setting of its genre.

(Pelosi, 2009:9)

Conspicuous by its absence from this list is perhaps the more obvious suggestion of direct contact with the artist/author, which Landers (2001:86) describes as "probably the most fruitful activity a translator can undertake." Evidently, this raises the difficulty of the author being unavailable or deceased, or, for that matter, the unavailability of any of the desired extrinsic information on Pelosi's list. In which case, should only living authors be translated? Or does self-translation become the only option? As neither of these scenarios is realistic or desirable, an alternative way of discovering intention must be sought. Pelosi recognises that in daily conversation, "we habitually know our interlocutor's intention without asking for clarification" (2009:8-9), recalling Sperber and Wilson's (1995) views of communication according to Relevance theory, first put forward in 1986: that communication is only possible if the recipient infers from the communicator's behaviour his/her, in Gutt's terms, "*informative intention*" (2000:24, his italics) and acts thereupon. With such assumptions about the communicator's intentions so frequently repeated, recognising them becomes instinctive. Applied to a text, then, this suggests the translator-reader can make assumptions about the author's intentions based on 'clues' written into the text and can instinctively

introduce an author who is implied by the text and writing itself. Pelosi worries that “it is possible that the work may point to a different understanding of the author than was actually the case” (Christie, 2011: n.p.) and it should always be remembered that the author may have made the meaning intentionally ambiguous, as Boase-Beier demonstrates in the case of Volker von Törne’s poem, *Beim Lesen der Zeitung* (Boase-Beier, 2004).

From the more reader-centred viewpoint of Cognitive Stylistics, Boase-Beier believes that analysing the author’s style helps the translator to infer authorial intentions, but claims a “pretence of translation” (2006:108), as implied and inferred intentions are still not *known*. As such, would implied and inferred intentions be acceptable for Intentists? I believe so. Intentists have a notion of an “implicit intender” (Pelosi, 2009:15) which is instinctively introduced, as the implied author is, when intentions are not certainly known. Additionally, although Intentists are by definition more creator-centred than receiver-centred, I believe they would applaud the reader for trying to discover the author’s intentions by inference, as they “see the interpreter’s role [...] as to recreate the intention journey” (ibid.).

### 2(ii). Intended Purpose

The notion of intended purpose relates to translation in three areas. The first two are connected: the intended purpose of the text and the intended purpose of the translated text. By acknowledging an ‘intended audience’, as seen previously, Intentists presuppose a text has an intended purpose – for, logically, if it did not have a target purpose, it would not have a target audience. A text’s intended purpose can be seen as what the author wanted it to do or to be used for, for example, it can be assumed that in producing a picture-book of the biblical story of Noah, illustrator Pauline Baynes intended the work to be used to introduce children to the bible (Baynes, 1988). In terms of the intended purpose of the translated text, or target text, Nord (2007:12) states, “one of the most important factors determining the purpose of a translation is [...] the intended receiver or audience.” The ‘purpose’ of the target text has become known in Translation Studies as the text’s *skopos*, following Vermeer’s *Skopostheorie* which places purpose as the primary consideration in any translation (Vermeer, 1989). Vermeer emphasises the *skopos* of the target text as determined by “the client who commissions the action” (ibid:227), however, I believe Intentism would favour the *skopos* of the text as intended by the original author. Nord (2007:19) recognises that the “[t]ranslational intention may or may not be similar” to that of the original author, which

could cause conflict for a translator working within an Intentist framework. In this situation, a translator is faced with trying to balance at least two considerations of intended purpose.

A further consideration is the purpose of the original author in having written the text. This is not the same as meaning and is much more general, for example, was the intended purpose to make money? To create a legacy? To cathartically release anger or grief? To commemorate a happy occasion? If these purposes are at odds with the translator's purposes, I do not believe there would be any negative effect on the target text. However, knowing, or reconstructing, the original author's intended purpose for producing the text can help the translator make pertinent translation choices, by understanding the author's cognitive state and "mind style" (Boase-Beier, 2006:38). If the intended purpose was to make money, this may mean the author was poor, and perhaps, in turn, the author's feelings on this matter became imbedded in the work.

### 2(iii). No Creative Input, No Meaning Input

One of the foremost maxims of Intentist theory is "No creative input, no meaning input" (Intentist Manifesto: n.p.), expressing the view that meaning is instilled in a work by those who create it and that the meaning does not lie with those who are not involved in the creative process, such as the interpreter (although in Intentist terms, the work may hold 'significance' for the interpreter.) As "the translator writes a new text when translating" (Boase-Beier, 2006:5), we can therefore establish the translator as the creator of a new text, who, as such, governs creative input and meaning input. In this case, the translator says and means in one language what the original author said and meant in another, as far as this is possible. However, there are other ways in which a translator may have a meaning input, both consciously and unconsciously. If the original writer has a mind style, it follows that so, too, must the translator-writer. This mind style will seep into the translated text, for it is "as impossible to produce a stretch of language in a totally impersonal way as it is to handle an object without leaving one's fingerprints on it" (Baker, 2000:244). For example, a translator naturally translating the Spanish word *cena* as 'dinner', 'tea' or 'supper' could slightly alter the meaning as understood by a (UK-specific) English reader, due to connotations of those English words being ascribed to the Spanish family having their evening meal. 'Supper', for instance, may suggest a higher social class than 'dinner', whereas *cena* is class-neutral (see Fox, 2004:73-83 on linguistic class codes.)

Similarly, a translator's personal beliefs and bias may also seep into a target text, but this may be done deliberately and actively on the part of the translator, to highlight or play down certain features of the text. Lewis (2010:14) explores the case of a film, *Gia*, in which the lesbian protagonist takes her girlfriend, Linda, home to meet her mother. Lewis demonstrates that in translation into several languages, the film's subtitles variously retain, and omit the ambiguity surrounding the words 'friend' and 'girlfriend', which potentially confuses the viewer when the picture on screen and the subtitles suggest conflicting information.

Transferring this example to a text, where the reader has no visual guide, a translator with, say, particularly anti-homosexual views, who omits the friend/girlfriend ambiguity effectively changes the meaning of the text for the reader. Likewise, a pro-homosexual translator may choose to highlight the nature of the relationship, but in doing so, still removes the ambiguity and some of the subtlety and can therefore also be said to have altered the meaning.

Whether the style or personal bias of the translator should or should not be visible in a text is not under discussion; the fact that it can be suggests the translator can influence the meaning, which supports the Intentionalist maxim.

#### 2(iv). Zero Intention, Zero Accountability

The second Intentionalist maxim under discussion is 'zero intention, zero accountability', whereby Intentionalist theory states that "a confused, hidden or denied intention leads to zero accountability" (Intentionalist Manifesto: n.p.). In other words, an author cannot be held accountable for his/her work if his/her intentions are not believed to have any influence on that work. An example of this, well-established in authorial intention discourse, and used as context by Burke (2004:1-7), is that of theorist and writer, Paul de Man. In 1987, it was discovered that during the early 1940s, de Man had written numerous journalistic articles expressing anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi sentiments (Burke, 2004:1). It is highly unlikely that every reader misinterpreted the text in the same way, therefore this must be a case of the author conveying the views and meaning he intended to express. Burke states that de Man "must be held to account for what he had written" (2004:5), and the important point for Intentionalists, here, is that if de Man's intentions are removed from the meaning of the text, he *cannot* be held accountable. Furthermore, it would be "hypocritical" (Pelosi, 2009:21) to criticise a creator for being offensive if the meaning of their work is held to lie in the receiver's interpretation.

What consequences would there be for the translator of de Man's work? What could the position of the translator be? As established earlier, the translator is the author of a new text and as such has a meaning input. The translator as author also has the intention to translate, whatever the motivation or *skopos* may be. Thus, it could be said that the translator makes a deliberate and intentional decision to translate an offensive text. If we hold accountable an author who intentionally wrote an offensive text, should the translator also be held accountable for writing the offensive meaning in a new language? In my opinion, this is delicate ethical ground. I do not believe the translator can claim to have no intention whatsoever in translating but it does seem, perhaps, unfair to hold us *as* accountable as the original author. In a sense, we are merely repeating what someone else has written, which does not mean we agree with or advocate their views. It is the author's intended meaning which is offensive, not the translator's, but (at the risk of circularity), in translating, does that not *become* the translator's intended meaning? Perhaps Intentists would hold the translator as accountable as the author. Indeed, Chesterman (2001:143) asks: "How are we to decide where the ethical responsibility of the translator stops – or does it stop at all?"

A further, somewhat startling, example featuring a case of accountability is that of Salman Rushdie's 1988 novel, *The Satanic Verses*, which was interpreted by certain communities as anti-Islamic and highly insulting (Anthony, 2009: n.p.). This led to Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, issuing a fatwa calling for Rushdie's execution and Rushdie was forced into hiding, under UK government protection (*ibid.*). But the persecution was not limited to the author himself: the Italian translator of the novel, Ettore Capriolo, was wounded in a knife attack; the Turkish translator, Aziz Nesin, was the target of an arson attack; and the Japanese translator, Hitoshi Igarashi, was in fact stabbed to death (*ibid.*). The question is, did Rushdie *intend* to write an offensive novel? And if so, are those translators *equally* as responsible for perpetuating the offence?

### 2(v). The Creative Trail

The artistic practice of leaving a 'creative trail' is the major consequence of Intentist theory on Intentist artwork. As Intentism "recognises and celebrates the relationship between an artist's creation and its creator" (Pelosi, 2009:3), artists working within an Intentist framework aim to preserve elements of the creative and editorial process in their finished work. Known technically as 'palimpsestism', from the ancient practice of reusing palimpsest manuscripts (Palimpsestism: n.p.), the "creative journey is manifest in the work as a trail



which can be pursued” (ibid.). For Translation Studies, this has positive consequences. Following the creative trail of clues helps the translator in the reconstruction of the author and of their intended meaning and it allows for greater reader activity. This may counterbalance Boase-Beier’s (2006:35) suggestion that a firm belief that meaning lies in the author’s intentions could potentially be rather dissatisfying for a translator, as it “denies the translator, as reader, much involvement in the process.” Furthermore, perhaps including a creative trail could enhance the translation process for the translator, as *writer*, as it requires considerable involvement on the part of the translator and so would be more fruitful.

This practice has further positive consequences for translation as a profession. Anchored in the idea that the accepted trend in translation and the expectation from the reader is fluency, translators producing translations which read as though they were originally written in the target language have caused the profession of translation to become, according to Venuti, “concealed” and “invisible” (Venuti, 2008:1). This has led Venuti to call for resistance and visibility (1995, here 2008). Leaving a creative trail of the process of translation in the product makes the translator visible and is a step in the right direction for raising awareness of the profession.

### 3. An Intentist Translation Method

Gutt makes the following important distinction regarding the link between the theory and practice of translation,: “*approaches* to translation favour (or reject) particular modes of translating [...] *accounts* of translation are interested in clarifying what this phenomenon is all about” (2000:202, his italics). Thus, approaches stand for the practice and accounts stand for the theorising of translation. Iser (2006:11) posits a similar differentiation between theory, which “lay[s] the foundations” and method, which “provide[s] the tools for processes of interpretation”. Theory, he says, “must undergo a transformation” (ibid.) into method in order to be utilised by a translator. Thus, I will attempt to transform the Intentist theory examined in the previous section into an Intentist method of translation and suggest what the translator should *do* in order to produce an Intentist-driven translation. Following Iser’s advice, this will be extracted from the five areas analysed in the previous section, and presented in a loosely chronological translation process order. I must emphasise that this is not a step-by-step guide; rather it is a selection of suggested criteria which, in my opinion, would produce an Intentist-driven translation.

For reasons of brevity, I refer below to an ‘Intentist translator’. However, in order to produce such a translation, although it may be more desirable in terms of Intentist ‘purity’, I do not believe the translator necessarily has to be an Intentist or subscribe to Intentist theory. I do think it would be profitable, though, if the translator were at least sympathetic to the movement’s values. It is important, therefore, that the translator has at least a basic understanding of Intentism before starting to translate.

In terms of selecting a text to translate within an Intentist framework, perhaps the ‘truest’ form would be to translate an Intentist author. However, I acknowledge that as Intentism is a new movement, there may have been little Intentist literature published, or made available for translation. In which case, bearing in mind the importance of *knowing* the author’s intended meaning, it seems that the first choice of text should be one written by an author who is still living. This clearly offers greater possibilities for discovering the author’s intentions, assuming, of course, that the author is available, willing to discuss the work with the translator, that they are honest. Schwartz offers an example of an Algerian author she has translated, who is alive but in hiding, making contact impossible (Schwartz and de Lange, 2006:9). As demonstrated in section 2(i), however, there are ways of reconstructing authorial intentions which can be used under such circumstances. Within an Intentist framework, this also allows deceased authors to be translated, which should perhaps be an Intentist translator’s second choice. As Intentism recognises both living and deceased creators, the translator’s text selection should not be limited, ultimately, in terms of choice or scope.

Landers (2001:33) stresses the importance of preliminary research for any literary translation, and, having selected a source text, the subsequent consideration for an Intentist translator is to seek the author’s intended meaning through research. There are various approaches available, direct contact with the author being the most desirable. Others include, as Pelosi suggested in section 2(i), reading notes or communication about the work and consulting earlier drafts. In the case of a re-translation, it could be very profitable to examine existing translations; the previous translator may have found different significance in the work which, in turn, could help to shape one’s own assumptions about the author’s intentions. It would also be beneficial to the translator to read other works written by the author (if any exist), as certain themes may be recurrent and indicative of intended meaning. If the meaning of the text is to be found in the style (Boase-Beier, 2006), then this should be carefully examined by the translator for clues as to the author’s intentions. Focussing on the author’s intended purpose

in writing could give insights into their cognitive state, as could more general research into their historical, biographical and social context; all of which aid a translator in reconstructing the author's intended meaning.

Intentist theorists favour the source text author's intended purpose for the text, whereas Translation theorists, such as Vermeer (1989), disregard it, to some extent, in favour of the purpose for which the target text is intended by the commissioner. This suggests that an Intentist-driven translation should place emphasis on the text's original purpose and that this purpose should be transferred to the target text. However, a *practising* translator, as well as taking into consideration the source text author and the target text commissioner, also has to respect various other parties involved, such the publisher or the editor, and *their* intentions for the text. A balance needs to be reached, but one which allows Intentism to inform the practice. I suggest that the intentions of the translator are given priority. For example, if such works as Conan Doyle's *Sherlock Holmes* stories, written originally for adults, are translated but the translator's intended (new) readers are children, it can be said that the translator has created a "new artwork based on a previous artwork" (Pelosi, 2009:12). The original intended purpose of the work has been reappropriated and a "new artistic intention" (*ibid.*) has been realised. Thus, it falls to the translator to declare their intention of purpose in relation to the intentions of the original author, forming another feature of Intentist-driven translation.

Continuing to focus on the translator's intentions, in terms of ethical translation practice, if the translator chooses to translate a text which has caused controversy or offence, his/her standpoint should be recognised and stated. The translator should defend their decisions and intentions in such a case; if we do not condone the content, we should say so. Perhaps the translator could negotiate with the publisher in terms of the packaging or presentation of the product. For example, a new translation of de Man's articles, as considered by Burke (2004) in 2(*iv*), translated with the intention of producing a historical document of the fact, rather than provocative, potentially propagandist material, could be presented in such a way as not to draw attention to the controversial content. This may contribute to demonstrating the translator's viewpoint and intentions.

As seen in section 2(*v*), the creative trail is a key feature of Intentist art practice, so it should also feature in Intentist translation. As an added bonus for the translator, this provides potentially the most creative and enjoyable part of an Intentist-driven translation process. It is

important to make visible, in Venuti's (2008) terms, elements of this process in the finished product, highlighting the fact that it is both a translation and an Intentist translation. Frequently-used translation techniques such as footnotes, explanations and glossaries all form part of this visibility. Whereas some, such as Landers (2001:93) oppose footnotes as they are "a disrupter", I advocate their use in this situation as an indication of Intentist practice. More unorthodox – and more interesting – options are available, too. Just as Intentist artists leave evidence of the editing process in their work, so, too, could translators leave evidence of their decisions, for instance, crossings-out kept in the final version, or perhaps even an earlier draft of certain sections included. Take, for example, the opening sentence from Serge Safran's *Le Voyage du Poète à Paris* (2011:9), provided with gloss for clarification:

Il quitta Bordeaux un jour où il pleuvait beaucoup.  
 he left Bordeaux one day where it was-raining much

One way of translating this is:

On the day he left Bordeaux, it was raining heavily.<sup>3</sup>

A translation according to the Intentist method could be:

~~It was a rainy day~~ On the day he left Bordeaux, it was (really-?) raining heavily.<sup>4</sup>

This gives an insight into the translation choices, and could help a reader to reconstruct the intended meaning, if there were any doubt.

A more extreme but fascinating technique (if only for students of literary translation) could take the form of a double-page layout, with the finished text on one side, and on the other, drafts and discarded ideas, perhaps even with explanations of decisions made on the intentional journey. This may not be to the general public's reading taste, but specialist publications such as the *Visible Poets* series, published by Arc, may be more enthusiastic.

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<sup>3</sup> The translations in this example are my own.

<sup>4</sup> For purposes of translation experimentation, I think it would also be interesting to see the results of such a creative trail, were the discarded ideas *not* crossed out.

Finally, although an Intentist translator should pay due consideration to the source text author's intentions (in all areas), I believe the translator's intentions are crucial to an Intentist method of translation and, therefore, such translation should focus, to some extent, on those intentions. Ideally in a preface, introduction or translator's note, the translator should state their intentions on such areas as how the text should be understood, what they intended it to be used for, their ethical standpoint on the subject matter, and the strategies used in translating and any effect that may have had on the meaning. Grierson and Wason put it perfectly in their 'Introduction on Introductions':

“[A] perusal of the preface may shed a light on the whole book that will obviate later misunderstandings [and] give the reader a glimpse of the writer's mind [...] as he saw his own work [...]”

(Grierson and Wason, 1946:1)

In fact, I think this statement could well support an Intentist call for prefaces to *all* works, not only translations.

#### 4. Conclusion.

This essay set out to examine the relationship between Intentist theory and the discipline of Translation Studies, in order to ascertain whether Intentism could inform, or shape, a practical translation. To assess that relationship, I first identified five key features of Intentist theory, placing them within a translation context to analyse their interaction. Finding the true *intended meaning* of a work is at the core of Intentism. However, this is not always possible, so inferring the meaning from the text, reconstructing the author and “pretend[ing]” (Boase-Beier, 2006:34) to know the meaning allow the translator to continue working. Similarly, discovering, or reconstructing, the author's *intended purpose* for having written the text helps the translator to better understand their mind style and make appropriate translation choices. Two Intentist maxims were considered next: *No creative input, no meaning input* stems from the Intentist belief that only the creator imbues the work with meaning. Thus, as the translator is the author of a new work and ‘creates’ a translation, so he/she can have an input into the meaning, such as (consciously or subconsciously) highlighting language according to personal bias. *Zero intention, zero accountability* derives from the Intentist argument that intention must be where the meaning of a work lies, otherwise no creator could ever be held accountable for producing offensive work. The concern for translation is whether those

authors' translators should be held as accountable. Finally, leaving evidence of the intentional journey in the work, known as the *creative trail*, presents the receiver with greater possibilities for discovering the intended meaning. This can be easily adopted by Translation Studies and provides a fruitful way of maintaining visibility.

I then turned to the theory-practice link, following Iser's (2006) guidance on drawing out a method from a theory in order to put it to practical use. From this fusion of Intentism and Translation, I extracted the principal criteria which, I believe, would contribute towards an Intentist method of translation, listed below.

The translator should:

- Have an understanding of Intentism and be sympathetic to those values, although does not necessarily have to fully subscribe to Intentism.
- Try to select a text by a living or available author in the first instance. However, if this is not possible, the translator should not be limited in terms of text selection.
- Research extensively, including (where applicable) notes and communications, drafts, previous translations, other works in the oeuvre, stylistic analysis of the text, historical, biographical and social background.
- Take the source text *skopos* into account as far as possible, but focus on the target text's *skopos* and the translator's own intentions of purpose.
- Be aware of and declare the translator's own ethical standpoint.
- Include, to greater or lesser extent, a creative trail of the translation process in the finished text.
- Write a preface or introduction stating intentions of meaning and purpose, ethical viewpoint on the content, strategies used, and the effect any of that may have had on the meaning.

It seems to me that some of these criteria may not be entirely practical. For example, a translator in financial difficulty may not have the luxury of being discerning about text selection. Another thought is that a translation with a heavy creative trail may not be widely-publishable. Furthermore, it appears to be a long-winded process, which may not be suited to translators working to a tight deadline. The next logical step in this investigation, then, would be to test this suggested method against a real text, allowing for evaluation of the practicality,

usefulness and desirability of such an approach, and perhaps even for its re-evaluation. I believe under certain circumstances, however, that this method would produce highly effective Intentist translations.

Pym (2010:165) encourages translation scholars to develop our own theories of translation. Perhaps it is possible to develop an Intentist theory of translation, then. But as theory “describe[s] what translators do actually do” (Chesterman and Wagner, 2002:2), this first needs an Intentist practice of translation, for which I have hopefully provided the starting point here, with my suggested Intentist method of translation.

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